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Mechanism to Authenticate a Reader to a Credential
ABSTRACT
Access to data objects stored on a credential such as a badge, smart card, etc. is typically
limited to user authorization through the use of a user-entered PIN or other mechanism. This
disclosure describes techniques to enable a credential reader to authenticate itself to a credential
and access protected objects on the credential without user interaction and without the use of any
global credential. The techniques define a simplified public-key infrastructure (PKI) hierarchy
appropriate for typical credentials, which are usually low-powered, passive, and offline.
KEYWORDS
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● Identification card
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● Near-field communication (NFC)
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BACKGROUND
A credential is an electronic device, e.g., a smart card, a smartphone, a smartwatch, etc.,
that stores data objects accessible under an access control policy. The stored data objects can
have varying degrees of sensitivity, e.g., photos, personal information, clearance information,
emergency contact information, etc. Access to these data objects is typically limited to user
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authorization through the use of a user-entered PIN or other mechanism. An example is a bank
card, where a PIN code is entered to access the signing key of the card used to authorize a
transaction.
A credential reader is an electronic device capable of requesting data objects from a
credential through a contact or contactless electronic interface. An example is a mobile phone
that employs a near-field communication (NFC) interface to read NFC-enabled tags.
Provisioning is the act of writing data to credentials or to readers.
A trust root is an entity trusted by a credential to digitally sign leaf credentials which
enable the credential to be trusted by other devices. In this context, the word ‘credentials,’ plural
in form but singular in meaning, refers to information, such as a certificate or signature from a
certificate authority, that establishes the identity of a device or entity and enables others to trust
the device or entity. Trust roots are expressed as trusted certificate authorities identified by a
signed X.509 certificate.
DESCRIPTION
This disclosure describes techniques to enable a credential reader to authenticate itself to
a credential (e.g., smartcard, badge, smartphone, smartwatch, etc.) and access protected objects
on the credential without user interaction and without the use of any global credential. In view of
the limited processing power and non-existent network connectivity for some credentials, e.g.,
badges, smart cards, etc., the techniques define a simplified public-key infrastructure (PKI)
hierarchy appropriate for low-powered, passive, offline credentials.
Per the techniques, prior to its issuance, a credential is provisioned with the public keys
of one or more trust roots. The expression of these public keys may be through an X.509
certificate, a raw public key, or another data object that includes the public key of the trust root.
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The credential stores these keys such that they are protected from deletion, e.g., by non-trusted
entities.
Readers are also issued credentials by trust roots, which establishes their identity and
issuing authority to a credential (such as a smart card or a badge). The credentials of a reader
comprise a private key (securely generated by the reader) and a public key. The identity and
issuing authority of the credentials of the reader are expressed as a signed X.509 certificate, a
digital signature of the public key performed by the trust root (including the identity of the trust
root), or through another mechanism that securely identifies the issuing authority of the
credentials of the reader and makes such credentials tamper-evident.
Access control lists for various data objects on a credential (e.g., smartcard, badge, etc.)
are written such that specific operations (e.g., read, sign, decrypt, etc.) can only be performed by
readers to whom credentials have been issued from authorized trust roots.
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Fig. 1: Authenticating a reader to a credential
Fig. 1 illustrates authenticating a reader (102) to a credential (104), e.g., a badge, to
enable the reader to securely read objects stored on the credential. The reader requests the badge
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identity (106) from the credential and receives it (108). The reader validates the badge identity
(110). The reader requests to read a specific protected object (112) from the credential. The
credential responds to the reader with an authentication request comprising a random nonce and
a list of trust roots authorized to access the object (114). This list may be expressed as a list of
X.509 certificates, a list of public key hashes, a simple list of trust root names, or by another
mechanism that enables a reader to uniquely identify a trust root.
The reader searches for credentials issued to it by that trust root to identify one that is
included in the list. If it finds none, processing terminates. Upon discovery of credentials issued
by an appropriate trust root (116) the reader returns to the credential a digital signature of the
nonce (118), the identity of the discovered trust root, the public key of the credential of the
reader used to sign the nonce, and the digital signature of the public key of the credential by the
discovered trust root (120).
Upon receipt of the above, the credential performs the following operations. It retrieves
the public key associated with the trust root identified by the reader (122). If none can be found,
processing terminates. It verifies that the data object requested by the reader can be accessed
with credentials issued by the identified trust root (124). If not, processing terminates. It verifies
the signature of the public key of the reader (126) using the public key of the trust root. If
verification fails, processing terminates. It verifies the signature of the nonce using the public
key of the reader (128). If verification fails, processing terminates. Upon successful verification,
the credential allows access to the data object requested by the reader (130).
In this manner, the described techniques enable authorized entities of various classes,
e.g., security officers, boarding gate agents, etc., to use credential readers that enable
authentication to a credential to allow limited reading of protected information off the credential.
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Effectively, the techniques provide a mechanism for a badge and a reader to develop trust in each
other. The trust mechanisms are usable even with badges or other credentials that have low
compute power and no network connectivity.
CONCLUSION
This disclosure describes techniques to enable a credential reader to authenticate itself to
a credential and access protected objects on the credential without user interaction and without
the use of any global credential. The techniques define a simplified public-key infrastructure
(PKI) hierarchy appropriate for typical credentials, which are usually low-powered, passive, and
offline.
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